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Abstract: Globalization is resulting in complex decisions by businesses as to 
where and what to produce, while free trade is resulting in a greater menu of 
choices for consumers, often with the blending of products and goods from 
various cultures, called ‘glocalization.’ This paper reviews the theories and 
practices behind these current happenings, which are each economic, political-
economic, institutional, and sociological, first by looking at the supply side of 
why certain countries produce the goods that they do, and then at the demand 
side, why consumers have particular, cultural tastes and preferences for goods. 
It also proffers theories to explain firm location and that of intra-industry trade. 
This occus when countries trade similar products rather than differentiating, as 
economic theory would suggest. After reviewing the literature, through 
numerous examples of political-economy and culture, it argues somewhat 
normatively that differences in culture and goods are a strength to the world 
community, and that globalization in the end will not likely result in a singular 
global culture with a uniformity of exactly identical economic goods anytime in 
the near future.  
Keywords: globalization, global culture, melting pot, product homogenization, 
glocalization 
 
The Supply of Culturally Diverse Goods 
The past few centuries have seen enormous changes through globalization, 
whether one considers that it began with: the roads of Rome, the travels of 
Marco Polo, the voyages of Columbus and da Gama, the European repeal of the 
Corn Laws, the invention of the steam engine, the gold standard and Victorian 
England, the World War II conference at Bretton Woods, or the Internet (Frieden 
2006). In many respects, cultures, and thus products, are changing dramatically; 
writes economist Tyler Cowen, “On one thing the whole world seems to agree: 
Globalization is homogenizing cultures” (Cowen 2002). Hopper quotes Ulf 
Hannerz as coining a new phrase, the “global ecumene,” or the possible 
development of a world culture with similar products (Hopper 2007). To the 
question if we will have a market based on technology, or of materialism and the 
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continued expansion of consumer goods, the answer is easily “yes.” The question 
if this market will be completely global is more difficult. Recently, scholars have 
turned to this cultural market aspect of globalization. As one author writes, “a 
scientific approach … is only beginning to develop” (Cesari 2002). 
In my first year of college, I was amazed to find my roommates all using 
similar soaps and toothpaste, even by students from different parts of the U.S 
and the world. How could this be, from such faraway places? Only later was I 
introduced to the concept of globalization, and that economist Milton Friedman 
would twirl around a pencil, showing that few people even knew that the 
graphite comes from Africa, the rubber from the Amazon River, and the wood 
from North America. It would be amazing to go back in time to the 
Enlightenment in colonial America, when the likes of such individuals as 
Benjamin Franklin could probably tell a visitor where each of the components of 
new gadgets came from, all over “the Orient.” Today, consumers are unaware of 
supply or simply do not care. Over time, countries have based the goods they 
produce, and consume, on economic comparative advantage, resources, 
institutions, culture, and political-economic systems. Culture in this context is 
defined as music, clothing, values, preferences, food, entertainment, and just 
about everything else.  
Early man, point out anthropologists, known as Cro Magnons, carried 
around trinkets and small pieces of art, that they traded with each other, and 
that these cultural goods maintained a unity, that may have enabled them to out-
survive Neanderthal man. The first economist and philosopher to write about 
culture, however, was the German Max Weber in the late 19th Century, but since 
then the general opinion, as professed by Francis Fukuyama (1999), is that 
culture has little effect upon economics. However, both the effect and the 
recognition are changing with globalization. The literature indicates that because 
of globalization, time and space no longer constrain culture or cultural products. 
Erez and Gati (2004) write that there are two levels of culture, a global one, and 
an individual one, which are perpetually influencing each other in both 
directions, such that culture is dynamic and completely changing. Abu-Febiri 
(2006) notes that globalization is causing true multiculturalism, but destroying 
cultural diversity, and that a holistic curriculum in schools is required. 
Khondker (2006) writes that the movement of different cultures closer 
together has often produced conflict, whether economic, social, or political. This 
is similar to what political-scientist Samuel P. Huntington (1993) called the 
“clash of civilizations,” which America and the West are now experiencing with 
the mid-East, and possibly with Asia in the future. But while the United States 
imports numerous products from Asia, Asia is not as quick at adopting American 
products, aside from financial goods. Another author, Buzan (2010), argues that 
culture can change from civilizations expanding or conquering another, 
politically, socially, or economically, and that culture is not a problem for 
stability, but that political structure is. This reminds one of World Wars I and II, 
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which saw the spread of American jazz music oversees. Doku and Asante (2011) 
echo Erez and Gati in writing that people today have a bi-cultural identity, of 
their home and globally, and that there is a “contamination” and loss of cultural 
identity from borrowing from other places.  
To study the effects of economic and cultural globalization and their affect 
upon products, one must turn to the theories of international trade which date 
back to David Ricardo in the mid-19th C. He showed that the law of comparative 
advantage holds that countries will specialize in those goods for which they have 
a cost advantage. Historically, this has depended in part on resources and 
geography. Economic theory was expanded by Heckscher and Ohlin, two early 
20th Century Swedish economists who demonstrated that countries specialize in 
those goods for which they have the factors to produce, and in the early 1940s, 
by the American Paul Samuelson and the German economist Wolfgang Stolper 
who analyzed how this produces economic “winners” and “losers.”  
International products also depend on economic institutions and systems 
that have taken years to develop, as stressed by institutional economics. 
Regional and national differences can thus be explained. Americans make better 
pharmaceuticals because their health care system charges so much that 
companies can afford the research costs. Canadians may make better snow 
shovels because consumers need them to survive cold, snowy winters, 
increasing demand. Japan makes better cameras because their culture may value 
filial piety and the need to record family activity. Germans may make better cars 
because their culture stresses engineering education. Italians may make better 
olive oil because most of the world’s olives grow in the Mediterranean, and the 
British, with their loquacious, chatty culture, make the best dry comedies. The 
question is if these cultural and institutional idiosyncrasies will diminish with 
the increased speed and communication of the globalized world. 
As political-economists such as Rosser and Rosser (2004) point out, all 
nations’ economies can be classified differently into systems across many 
criteria, such as by: allocation, customs, forms of ownership, role of planning, 
types of incentives, income redistribution, social safety nets, and impact of 
ideology and politics. Whereas the “traditional economy” allocates wealth based 
on customs, such as India’s cast system, and results in many cultural products, 
perhaps seasonal, the “market economy” does so by supply and demand, as in 
the West. Finally, the “command economy” does so by choices made by powerful 
leaders, such as in ancient empires or modern dictatorships. Combinations exist, 
such as the planned-market economies, as in France and Japan. In Islamic 
nations, interest is forbidden, but allowed for some financial instruments, such 
as in Saudi Arabia, while China under Confucianism encourages a greater good 
for the society, and more saving (Rosser and Rosser 2004). Scandinavian 
countries have developed strong social safety nets, due to the historical 
importance of unions, and corporatism that links businesses with employees 
Todd J. Barry 
408 
(Rosser and Rosser 2004). All of these factors affect the types of firms that 
develop and the products they offer. 
According to Michael Storper (2009), the best resource, the combination 
of political and economic systems, unique to every country, is the “whip,” which 
determines the rules for competition which increase “incentives to firms in 
different places to become more efficient over time” (Storper 2009, 1). Other 
economic factors are also important, such as economies of scale, which give cost 
advantages to larger firms. The timing of entry is important such that early 
entrants are better able to satisfy demand, and sequencing, in which large firms 
or firms late to enter the market may be hurt by worse terms of trade already 
globally established. Storper writes that it “depends on the intricate 
socioeconomic processes at the local level and appropriate broader institutional 
enabling conditions…” (Storper 2009, 2). These conditions include institutions, 
of which Gregory and Stuart (2004) indicate five, such as: structure and 
organization of economic decision making, rules for the market, property rights, 
incentives for setting goals, and the role of government (Gregory and Stuart 
2004). These institutions, whether in societies or large companies, take hold 
after long periods of time, and discourage risk-taking in new types of products, 
which are left to entrepreneurs. 
Political-economies have affected business in Japan, for example, where 
several hundred years of peaceful rule under the Tokugawa shogunate led to 
improvements in business, infrastructure, and literacy (Rosser and Rosser 2004, 
148). Asian companies have strong links to each other and to banks, collectively 
called keiretsus, which unfortunately are a hidden barrier to trade to outsiders 
(Rosser and Rosser 2004, 151). Japan also benefits from strong supply chains, 
and the kanban system, allowing for faster logistics and reduced unnecessary 
inventory. So, for years, Japan was able to make high quality products (Rosser 
and Rosser 2004, 156). In the case of Germany, one of today’s strongest 
economies, not only is the nation good at engineering roads and cars because of 
its education system, but also because of a corresponding apprenticeship 
program. Its business managers have more engineering degrees and experience 
than any other place in the world, dating since the founding of now Daimler-
Chrysler in the 1880s (Rosser and Rosser 2004, 232, 235-236).  
The products of the British people could, moreover, be due to the dreary 
weather. I visited London a few years back, and observed their way with words - 
the intricate nursery rhymes that parents read to children, mostly originating in 
England, with hidden meanings dating back to English history. Some point to 
their economic lack of entrepreneurship, excessive strikes, lack of technology 
usage, and not joining the euro. Economist Mancur Olson (1982) blames it on a 
lack of a historical, “general shakeup,” but this is questionable because of 
England’s Civil War and Glorious Revolution which established rights, and the 
wars following the colonial period (Rosser and Rosser 2004, 576-578).  
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According to Irwin M. Stelzer (2007, 1) “Great Britain is in a great time 
zone to do business, and uses the language of business, English, with similar 
terminology to that of Wall Street. It also has an attractive, lenient regulatory 
system, low taxes, and ‘an appealing quality of life,’ such that some want it to 
replace New York as a financial center.” Despite these attractions, stock market 
efficiency is slower, and it has a worse deposit insurance system, eccentric 
mayors, a poor exchange rate, expensive taxis, and more crime. The British 
culture though is seen as best at assimilating culture from Muslim immigrants 
(Pauly 2004).  
It is interesting to consider the cultural differences between Europe, Asia, 
and Latin America, but the contributions different factors play are unclear, 
although one could try running a linear regression. The types of capitalism 
practiced in parts of the world also differ, which affect firm size and types of 
products. While the American system is essentially laissez faire and is referred to 
as the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism, the European model involves more state 
regulation and legal codes, and the Asian model is based on high capital 
formation directed by the state (Gregory and Stuart 2004). Interestingly, 
communist writer German economist Karl Marx never called for the isolation of 
an economy from trade. Nevertheless, Joseph Stalin’s original model called for 
autarky, which lasted longer than other features of the Soviet economy, because 
the Russians were afraid that trade would “undermine the effectiveness of 
central planning” (Rosser and Rosser 2004, 276-277). 
While some look towards the small companies in other countries as a 
reason for differentiated products, it is commonly estimated that some 70% of 
all U.S. businesses are small, mom-and-pop shops. However, U.S. businesses are 
taxed too high, since small firms are often taxed at individual taxation rates, and 
for larger firms there is essentially a high, flat tax. Some economists have 
speculated that with the global slowdown there will be a race to reduce rates, or 
to relocate. Japan’s tax rates were at 39.5%, but they recently reduced taxes by 
5% (Barrasso 2012). The U.S. rate is also triple that of Ireland, and 10 points 
higher than Austria, Denmark, or China, forcing many U.S. subsidiaries overseas 
(Kocieniewski 2011). Since 2000, 30 developed countries have cut their business 
tax rates (Barrasso 2012, 1). In the U.S, the revered Burger King headquarters 
recently departed to Canada. 
The decision making of multinational companies as to where to locate and 
supply products are complex, and involve ownership of assets, particularly: 
whether to share intellectual property assets, whether or not to license 
technology to foreign firms, and whether to use advantages of countries in raw 
materials or cheaper labor. Finally, there is question of where consumers are 
located so as to lessen transportation costs. Internationally, five of the twenty 
largest world multinational firms are located in France or Germany, four are in 
the United States, also the largest four, and three are in Great Britain. 
Multinationals operating in the home country, but seeking to do business in a 
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host country, may find many unaccustomed regulations. National defense, 
telecommunications, and transportation tend to be the most regulated industries 
(Sawyer and Sprinkle 2009). 
Raleigh Barlowe (1993) provides additional suggestions for national 
specialization, which some scholars call “location theory,” which dates back to 
the 19th Century. He attempts to explain why new industries develop in certain 
locations. Worker training, skills, education, and motivation vary considerably 
across countries, and one of the largest implications is that of transportation 
costs, with the producer trying to minimize them as much as possible. However, 
national pride may cause citizens of one country to support the production of 
traditional products, like the “Buy American” campaign. (Barlowe 1993) Places 
like Silicon Valley developed as a location for technically minded individuals to 
form networks with each other, writes Fukuyama (Fukuyama 1999). Location 
theory also examines why, after taking-off, additional expansion of the sector is 
limited to the original location and its surrounding areas. Sectors begin to form 
in places because the unit costs are lower, which Harrison et al. (1996) call static 
agglomeration. They define dynamic agglomeration as not costs but 
technological learning across places (Harrison et al. 1996). 
Returning to Storper, he continues by arguing against Ricardian 
economics, writing instead that, “differentiated socioeconomic forms of 
organization and practice are key to creation” (Storper 2009, 4). Anthropologists 
have long debated if variations in economic organizations are simply an 
indication of different resource endowments and factor costs, which led to 
various power structures and incentives. Or, are people in different places not 
the same in terms of rationality, goal seeking, learning, and cognition? While 
mainstream economists favor the first, contemporary institutional economics go 
beyond. They hold that different initial conditions create scarcities and dilemmas 
amongst consumers and producers, resulting in unique institutional rules. A 
third view holds that institutions will obviously be dissimilar, but that practice 
and history will result in different types of capitalism, firms, and production 
systems (Storper 2009). Storper adds that what is missing from the arguments is 
what the layperson calls ‘culture,’ and that this is why the Japanese have a knack 
for quality control, the Italians such a passion for design. Storper’s argument is 
that “we still have [difficulty] deciphering such differences,” and that “this is the 
‘dark matter’ of regional economies,” (Storper 2009), meaning it is currently 
unexplained. 
Storper provides several examples to highlight his points. First, he 
discusses the differences between owning a restaurant in the U.S. versus France. 
The supply chains for ingredients are different, much harder to obtain fresh, low 
cost products in the U.S. than in France, which affects the supply curve. Second, 
there are lower barriers to entry into the restaurant market in the U.S., and third, 
U.S. restaurants are pushed by urban locations and profit-making to become 
larger. Fourth, there is a difference of culture in the kitchen, with the U.S. having 
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a more pronounced hierarchy. Finally, there are differences in innovation, with 
most new ideas coming from the creativity of the less-stressed France, Italy, and 
Spain. These reasons together give France an epicurean competitive advantage 
(Storper 2009). 
Storper proffers additional examples, such as the differences between 
Hollywood and Bollywood, between Milan and New York fashion, and Danish 
versus French or American food processing. The first two probably depend on 
taste and preferences, the last probably on historical food laws. In another 
example, he suggests that the apparel industry ranges from geographically 
divided chains of mass production to local, specialized firms, the former trying to 
copy the latter. In the car industry, products are more comparable than in 
fashion, but Detroit manufacturers, even with today’s technology spill-over 
effects, have less innovation than Tokyo or Germany. Each use marketing 
information, and frame business problems, differently (Storper 2009). Finally, 
“winner-take-all” systems such as Silicon Valley or Hollywood create products 
distinct with “locally constructed techniques that are rooted in the local system 
as a whole” (Storper 2009, 10).  
Intra-industry trade, the trade between countries of similar products, is 
increasingly dramatically worldwide, defying traditional theory that countries 
should specialize in producing certain goods. The best explanations offered are 
that certain countries have developed, over time, specific tastes and preferences 
which open the door for niche markets of slightly differentiated products. Other 
explanations are that of “brands,” that is, the use of prestigious names on 
products by marketers to make it appear as if the products are more unique than 
they seem, first written about by economists Joan Robinson and John Kenneth 
Galbraith.  
Marketing can be used to convince consumers to buy goods because the 
country of the business has a reputation for it; consider bottled water companies 
in France. Mass marketing has been used in the U.S. since the 1950s to 
“generate” demand; simply image the drawings of soup cans by artist Andy 
Warhol. A third explanation is that of “product life cycles,” that new products are 
altered by countries as they move from being the hottest fads, to the standard 
products in the industry, to the “has-beens,” while theories by Paul Krugman 
suggest that economies of scale may result in firms producing at lower cost and 
charging less. “Overlapping demand” theory suggests that countries will trade 
similar products if consumers are similar across countries (Sawyer and Sprinkle 
2009). Mishra (2014) calls this “hyper commodification” of products. A final idea 
I offer is that of risk, that diversification reduces cyclicality or shocks disturbing 
supply. Some nations, because of their political-economic system, may choose to 
block trade, while others follow an open policy, all which have an effect upon 
businesses. In short, culture affects supply and trade, because it affects whether 
or not products supplied meet consumers’ demand. Under Say’s Law, supply 
comes first, but this is a “chicken-versus-the-egg” type question. In advanced 
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economies, consumers have the option of rejecting products that do not conform 
to their tastes, and they can therefore save their money instead for future 
spending. 
The Demand of Culturally Diverse Goods and the Future 
It is hard to say what will happen with globalization and product 
homogenization in the future, but one could envision the world as an unending 
salad bar, made of numerous components. In economics, demand depends on 
many factors, such as income, relationships to other goods, shocks to the 
economy, and tastes and preferences, while quantity demanded depends mostly 
on price. Taste and preferences can never fully be explained, whether they 
depend on nature or nurture, except that economists assume consumers are 
rational. However, one would think it depends strongly on culture. We can look 
to the U.S. as an example, starting in the early 1800s, when some authors see the 
beginning of globalization due to the convergence of commodity good prices 
from improvements in rail and steam. America, because of immigration, was 
becoming what has been known as the “melting pot.” In recent years, many 
scholars have instead called America a “garden salad.” Individual, national, and 
ethnic differences still remain and are somewhat pronounced, in pockets of 
differences, which include products.  
A study of U.S. history reminds one of the independent tenement sections 
that arose in the 19th C. in cities like New York, Chicago, and elsewhere. After 
arriving at Ellis Island, immigrants would organize such that some 
neighborhoods would be Italian, others Irish, some German, with the similar 
religious groups tending to interact, reside nearby, marry within themselves, and 
combine ideas to form new products. Consider the recent Disney movie, “The 
Hundred-Foot Journey” about the blending of cultural goods. The same activity is 
now taking place in numerous countries and across the world, resulting in 
changed tastes and preferences. On the other hand, fragments of culture 
continue to last for years - in fact, America has acquired a philosophical 
background from the Greeks, religions from the mid-East, science and math from 
China and 7th C. Islam, and languages from Europe. The Greeks prided 
themselves on the ability to “synthesize” or amalgamate culture (Cohen 2002). 
Hari Prasad Bhattarai quotes sociologist Van den Berge as providing a 
definition of such garden salads as, “societies wherein several distinct social 
and/or cultural groups coexist … and share a common economic system that 
makes them interdependent, yet maintain a greater or lesser degree of 
autonomy and a set of discrete institutional structures in other spheres of social 
life” (Bhattarai 2004). According to Bhattarai, this is one way out of four ways in 
which a society can deal with culture, and this can be applied to goods as well: 
amalgamation, in which various cultures are transfixed into an entirely new 
culture, assimilation, in which minority segments adopt the culture of the 
majority, segregation, the complete separation and discrimination of cultures, 
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and pluralism, the garden salad, also referred to by some writers as a “rainbow” 
of different colors, or a “fruit salad.” Consumers can choose their culture and 
demand products just like at a salad bar. In classical economics, inputs are 
considered fixed, and it is only in more modern economics that assumptions are 
relaxed to allow for changes in tastes and preferences (Salvatore 1996).  
Products are being affected by globalization in various ways. Just as 
globalization affects income inequalities both within and in-between countries 
(Williamson 2002), so too does globalization affect cultural change. Within 
countries, it is leading to a larger number of products available, and thus cultural 
diversity. But in-between nations, cultural diversity is lessening. What is the net 
effect? Cowen (2002) writes that niche markets demanding specific tastes and 
preferences, or vegetables in the salad, are emerging globally, evidenced by the 
newly found popular demand for “Indonesian gamelan music to African cinema” 
and “Haitian naïve painting to Tuvan throat singing” (Cowen 2002). Culture is 
simultaneously being either “dumbed down” into pop, Hollywood culture, or 
lifted up, by “yuppies” and youth who tend towards the international.  
Sociologist Peter L. Berger (1997) identifies four main types of global 
market cultures: the Davos culture, one of business people which is named after 
a resort in Switzerland, followed by the Faculty Club International that consists 
mostly of academics. Third is the widely popular culture of McWorld, followed by 
the Evangelical Protestant Movement, which is growing in Latin America and the 
far East, and is the most “aggressive” in spreading its views (Bergen 1997). Still, 
writes Cowen (2002), music today is “healthier and more diverse” than it has 
ever been, as some countries like Egypt and Brazil are producing more than 70% 
of their own music. Films are being produced around the globe, and the 
Netherlands, with under 10 million people, is writing the world’s best fiction 
novels (Cowen 2002). 
Psychology theory shows that consumer demand decisions are made not 
always rationally, but with imperfect information and with local points of 
reference, or “anchors,” a process called “situationalism” (Storper 2009, 7). Also 
of importance are comparison and emulation, and how “actors” process 
information. Storper calls all of this “context,” defined as “the division of labor 
and the networks in which the actor finds herself or himself, … , hence her or his 
‘input’ structure of cues and reference points” (Storper 2009, 8). According to 
Mishra (2014), consumption depends on “bandwagon” and “snob” effects, 
termed “conspicuous consumption” by 1920’s economist Thorstein Veblen 
(Mishra 2014).  
The majority of the world’s products are western, since the West grew 
faster and earlier from trading and political relationships, technology, resources, 
and freer markets (Storper 2009). The changes to culture will have, as in all 
globalization, winners and losers. The largest winner, says economist Niall 
Ferguson, will be what he calls “chimerica,” a United States-Chinese linkage. This 
is not to forget India, with its English language services. Already we see this with 
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the “Americanization” or “McDonaldization” of the world, with America 
marketing its style of products abroad, while accepting the entrance of novel 
foreign products. Consequently, to help preserve foreign cultures, the U.S. must 
be careful not to become a cultural imperialist, causing cultural loss. America and 
Europe have had a negative history of colonization, dating back to the Romans’ 
attempt to civilize the “barbarians,” the Middle-Age Crusades, and 19th C. 
Christian missionaries. Now, as the world’s leader, the U.S. must be respectful 
and not repeat past mistakes. The first question is whether we should as a global 
society try to stop cultural loss (Steger 2009, 48)? 
My answer here, which might come as a surprise to some, is “yes” to a 
large extent. Product and cultural separateness, or diversity, creates many 
benefits, a veritable diversification of strengths, and a better society. Contrary to 
the common wisdom saying in China that “the nail that stands out gets 
hammered in,” one needs to look only at the experience of the Pilgrims to see 
that from America’s inception, the diversity of cultures has its benefits. In their 
second winter or the 17th Century, the Pilgrims used help from Native Americans 
in farming corn, and this exchange of culture allowed them to survive. But, if we 
choose to prevent the globalization of cultural goods, we should do so in a way 
that does not impede globalization’s strengths, and thus refine it, not end it. 
Borders have traditionally protected culture and goods, but since this is 
changing, we need to look at ways to increase pluralism, to understand cultural 
diversity. To stop the harms of cultural globalization some look to France. Write 
Gordon and Meunier (2001), it is a nation of people, since the 1930s Popular 
Front, which turned to its government frequently, earning it the sobriquet the 
“dirigiste state” (Gordon and Meunier 2001, 15-18). 
France, a largely socialist country, spends over three billion government 
dollars per year trying to preserve its cultural products, from food, to film, to 
language, through government agencies that enlist over 12,000 employees 
(Cowen 2002), fearing globalization will erode sovereignty. In 1959, Charles de 
Gaulle created the Ministry of Culture, and cultural centers called the Maisons de 
la Culture. In 1967, Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber wrote, “The American 
Challenge,” a staple for the French people. Since the G-8 trade rounds of the early 
1990s, France has sought protection for its cultural goods, and then 
domestically, in 1996, passed the “Toubon Law,” requiring that 40% of all radio 
broadcasts be in French. Food ranks next in importance, and the country has 
fought the European Union strongly to obtain barriers to genetically modified 
beef (Gordon and Meunier 2001). Still, the terrorist attacks of January 2015 on 
the Chalie Hebdo cartoon newspaper highlights the need to better integrate 
those of the Muslim faith into Europe, while in the United States, the Islamic 
population is much smaller. 
Language, which is associated with stature, class, and influence, has been 
regulated by the French going back to 1635 and the establishment of the French 
Academy. The 1975 Bas-Lauriol law required all advertising to be in French, and 
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in 1998, resulted in 8,000 linguistic inspections, 658 warnings, 255 cases, and 
124 completed prosecutions (Gordon and Meunier 2001). In other nations, 
Canada’s government requires its radio stations to dedicate a certain portion of 
the music to naturally born artists such as Celine Dion. Meanwhile, South Korea, 
Spain and Brazil have requirements regarding content for their film industries, 
which Spain and France also do so for their television industry. India at a certain 
time prohibited the sale of Coke (Cowen 2002). But, countries must still respect 
cultural diversity. In the United States, “hip” language introduced over the last 
several generations, along with technology which favors shorter messages, is 
diluting the quality of speech and writing. And, America’s culture has become 
dangerous through production of violent video games, which cannot be 
regulated due to free speech and commerce laws, the Supreme Court ruled. This 
is one of the reasons why the U.S. has so much gun violence, and has led to a so-
called detached young men crisis, veritably an epidemic, which the U.S. is now 
culturally exporting to the world. The United States culture places less control on 
violence and a greater emphasis on minimizing sexuality graphically, as 
compared with European states.  
Other nations are using various means to pause economic globalization, 
the rapid spread of goods and ideas to all ends of the world. Writes van Elteren 
(2003), “Although political and cultural elites in some countries have imposed 
regulations and subsidies to protect local cultural content, the major thrust is 
clearly in the opposite direction,” a direction of openness (van Elteren 2003, 
175). Developing countries suffer from low wages and poor working conditions, 
which Western activists protest. So, they will have to turn towards citizens, or 
non-governmental organizations. Since the Seattle riots in 1999, dozens of world 
agencies have formed to deal with development issues, including cultural ones. 
Talks at the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit, and 
the 2007 UN Bali Climate Summit, tried to address environmental issues, which 
affect quality and work conditions. In 2001, the World Social Forum was formed; 
as of 2008, there exist 150 civil society organizations associated with it, among 
them: trade unions, think tanks, agricultural groups, indigenous peoples’ 
assemblies, financial watch-dog groups, religious groups, and human rights 
organizations (Steger 2009, 46, 125-30). 
Increasing awareness of racism and ethnocentrism and a need for greater 
multicultural understanding will be required to address global culture. However, 
the garden salad world will be able to maintain its differences in products. Even 
Hopper denies that there will be a future global culture in the full sense of the 
word. Cowen quotes Englishman John Grey calling it a product of the utopian 
Enlightenment, a dream of “a single worldwide civilization in which the varied 
traditions and cultures of the past were superseded by a new, universal 
community founded in reason” (Cowen 2012). Today, we want a world that is 
not bland and uniform, but flourishing in its uniqueness. Mid-1800s economist 
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John Stuart Mill briefly mused about the importance of diversity, writing about 
improving our “arts or practices” and “points of character” (Carden 2008).  
Contrary to many opinions, this one does not see a complete 
homogenization of culture or products, and instead portend a garden salad of 
diverse, cultural goods. One can talk to visitors to South Korea or Vietnam, who 
encounter high-rise offices businesses and restaurants like McDonald’s, instead 
of rice paddies, to see that global culture changes. “Glocalization” may be 
products’ future. Volkman quotes Larsson (2001) as saying: “In the Philippines 
you can order a McSpaghetti, in Thailand a pork burger with chili and basil, in 
India a Maharaja MacMutton burger, in Japan a teriyaki burger, in Norway a 
salmon burger, in Uruguay an (sic) egg burger” (Volkman 2014, 6). However, 
culture by its definition is constantly changing, that is its nature; it has been 
throughout history. And, it does not appear that a complete world culture “for 
all,” is developing. Jocelyne Cesari (2002) supports this idea of a garden salad, 
writing what the world is witnessing is “neither a complete disaggregation of 
existing social systems nor a complete integration of social systems into a single 
form, homogeneous and coherent” (Cesari 2002). 
In conclusion, why Germans make better beer, Mexicans better silver 
jewelry, Iraq better rugs, or China better textiles depends not only on 
comparative advantages, but on historical, economic, cultural, and political 
systems, consisting of many kinds of institutions, that affect businesses. This is 
not to stereotype, but to offer prime examples. It would be more surprising if 
countries around the world produced exactly the same products with the same 
quality, timelessly. In fact, it seems almost rational that they should be different, 
but, with globalization, products are becoming similar, but not to the extent that 
one can label them identical under a global culture. While the Chinese leader 
Mao Tse-Tung may have been correct that we should let a thousands flowers 
bloom, we need also to respect past cultures, such as in entertainment like film 
and literature, or lose a sense of cohesive national identitiy. 
According to Mishra (2014), the future of globalization may have either 
positive or negative results, both laid out by Benjamin R. Barber, and warned 
about by Kirkpatrick Sale in 1995 and R. Cronk in 1996 as undermining 
traditional values and causing corporate-determined product selection. But, 
globalization will depend on governments, international organizations, and 
masses of citizens. Volkman writes, “‘market forces’ cannot determine or 
compete with culture, since culture entirely determines the relevant market 
values” (Volkman, 4).  
The neo-liberalism of the 1990s and 2000s, which emphasized free trade 
at all costs, has been replaced by a Post-Washington Consensus that centers 
around social issues, such as environmental impact upon the quality of goods. 
Writes Cowen, “It’s impossible to deny that globalization will bring the demise of 
some precious and irreplaceable small cultures, and for that reason we should 
hope [it] does not enjoy total triumph” (Cowen 2002), which it will not. He refers 
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back to Austrian Joseph Schumpeter’s “creative destruction” theory of new 
technology replacing old ones, but says we “hope for the creativity without the 
destruction” (Cowen 2002). Globalization is a product of people, and therefore it 
and its effects are not inevitable. Hopefully, nations will be able to work 
independently and together to preserve cultural nuances, which they will be able 
to, so that the globalized world will consist of a peace-abiding society, which uses 
cultural awareness to reduce clashes of ethnic intolerance, and with pockets of 
individualism, just like a garden salad. 
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